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The Sahel is a crisis polygon. Following the 
French intervention in Mali in 2013, this vast 
and sparsely inhabited region has seen the grad-
ual resurgence and the realignment of jihadist 
armed groups that have extended their opera-
tional range further south – across northwest 
African borders, where they interfere in and in-
teract with already existing conflicts – and in-
creased the challenges for regional stability. 
The Algeria-sponsored Accord pour la Paix et la 
Reconciliation au Mali failed to bring about a sus-
tainable solution to the violent conflict that flared 
up in 2012 between rebel armed groups (now 
clustered in the Coordination des Mouvements de 
l’Azawad – CMA) and Bamako’s government and 
the pro-Bamako groups (now under the so-called 
‘Plateforme’). In a region where few job oppor-
tunities exist beyond extra-legal economies and 
smuggling of all sorts, the drive to capture the 
dividends of peace has often prevailed over good 
faith, significantly slowing down the implemen-
tation of key provisions of the Accord. While 
the peace process formally stumbled ahead, 
armed attacks gradually intensified in the north, 
and expanded to Mali’s central regions, too. In 
February 2017, a devastating suicide attack in 
the city of Gao killed some 80 fighters from op-
posing armed groups as they were preparing to 
deploy joint security patrols. While the two-year 
‘Interim Period’ for the implementation of the 
Accord is almost over, progress remains slow 
and difficult.
Armed groups involved in the peace process 
keep fragmenting along ethnic/tribal lines that 
are dominated by local appetites and agendas. 
New self-defence groups spring up every month 
to exert leverage and extract benefits from the 
most delicate phases of the implementation pro-
cess, while others rise as proxies that allow re-
mote government by Bamako.
Growing levels of insecurity and banditry, partly 
triggered also by Bamako’s playing realignment 
and repositioning games among local groups, 
are ultimately beneficial to jihadists. By sitting 
on the fence, jihadists can appear as an effective 
alternative source of assistance, protection and 
dispute resolution – both political and economic 
– to disempowered segments of the population. 
Sahelian central Mali
While international attention was focused on the 
rebellious north of Mali and large-scale attacks 
in the broader region, Mali’s central regions of 
Mopti and Ségou experienced increasingly high 
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levels of insecurity. A long sequence of intimi-
dations and targeted killings exposed how local, 
regional and global dynamics overlap, resulting 
in the reproduction, propagation and expansion 
of jihadism. At local level, inter- and intra-ethnic 
cleavages for access to natural resources (most 
notably pasturelands) have exacerbated latent 
conflictual relationships between Tuareg and 
Fulani pastoralists – and, among them, between 
the social groups descending from the Macina 
Empire, i.e. the landowning elites and the vast 
majority of outcasts and former slaves. 
At national level, Bamako’s sponsorship of pa-
tronage networks has historically relied heavily 
on local elites for the control of outer regions. 
When, in 2012, Fulani elites failed to protect lo-
cal populations from what was seen as a Tuareg 
invasion, marginalised groups revolted: several 
among them sought protection by joining the 
ranks of the Mouvement pour l’Unicité du Jihad en 
Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO). In 2013, when the 
formal authority of the state was re-established 
in central Mali, Fulani elites seized the oppor-
tunity to reinstate their social pre-eminence by 
stigmatising potential outbreaks of rebellion as 
promoted by individuals aligned with a jihadist 
agenda. Malian armed forces thus easily conflat-
ed local struggles for access to pasturelands with 
terrorism. In cases that have been documented, 
their abuse of margin-
alised Fulani pastoral-
ists could rely on the 
tacit approval of local 
and national elites. 
These patterns exacer-
bated tensions, push-
ing Fulani shepherds 
to form self-defence 
militias. As a result, 
the year 2015 saw a 
discernible pattern of 
assassinations target-
ing Fulani elites, chefs 
de village, and all those who were seen as coop-
erating with the state in defence of the status quo: 
army and police stations, forest guards, schools 
and traditionalist imams all came under fire.
Jihadist organisations were quick to exploit 
these cleavages and grievances, and managed to 
co-opt local demands for protection, redistribu-
tion and moral integrity by framing the revolt 
against corrupt neopatrimonial regimes backed 
by the West as part of the struggle for the global 
jihad. Instrumental to this end, the Fulani jihad-
ist preacher Amadou Koufa exploited an ethno-
nationalist rhetoric echoing the mythical jihadist 
heritage of the Macina Empire, and managed 
to coagulate several Fulani self-defence militias 
within the Front de Libération du Macina (FLM). 
As time went by, however, the FLM forged closer 
links with the former Tuareg rebel Iyad Ag Ghali, 
today Mali’s jihadist éminence grise. 
Saharan north and western Mali
The desert expanses of north-western Mali have 
been home to a plethora of different armed 
groups, including jihadists, nationalists and 
criminals (and mixed versions thereof), most 
of them rooted in local Tuareg and Arab eth-
nic networks. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQMI) is certainly the group which attracted 
greater international attention, while forging ties 
to local actors – both state and non-state – which 
ensured its longstanding resilience. AQMI was 
founded in 2007 from the ashes of the jihadist 
formations which fought the Algerian civil war. 
Since then, however, the internal coherence of 
AQMI was undermined by leadership struggles. 
In particular, the anarchic attitude of one of its 
most prominent chiefs, the Algerian Mokhtar 
Belmokhtar, led to conspicuous fractures and 
realignments of splinter groups, whose alleged 
involvement in the trafficking of haram (forbid-
den) goods was regarded with suspicion by the 
supreme command-
ers based in Algeria. 
In spite of his doc-
trinal misalignment, 
Belmokhtar’s involve-
ment in lucrative illicit 
trafficking ensured that 
his katibats (fighting 
units) had the resourc-
es to carry out spectac-
ular attacks against soft 
targets scattered across 
the region, thereby 
propagating insecurity 
regionally. By targeting places where Westerners 
and African ruling elites gather, Belmokhtar 
claimed responsibility for the attacks against 
In-Amenas (Algeria, January 2013), Arlit and 
Agadez (Niger, May 2013), Bamako (March and 
November 2015), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso, 
January 2016) and Grand Bassam (Ivory Coast, 
March 2016). 
However, on 2 March, Iyad ag-Ghali appeared in 
a video along with prominent clerics and fight-
ers, announcing the coming together of the main 
jihadist groups involved in Mali’s conflict under 
the umbrella of a new armed coalition, named 
‘Jihadist organisations [...] managed to 
co-opt local demands for protection, 
redistribution and moral integrity by 
framing the revolt against corrupt 
neopatrimonial regimes backed by 
the West as part of the struggle for the 
global jihad.’
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Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wal-Muslimin (Group 
for the Support of Islam and Muslims – JNIM) 
and acting under the banner of al-Qaeda. 
Such a development shows an explicit conver-
gence formula that somehow echoes the strat-
egy adopted by Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria. The 
video proclaiming the birth of JNIM features 
the presence of the most prominent jihadist 
leaders in the region. However, the absence 
of Mokhtar Belmokhtar himself has nurtured 
speculation about his death in an airstrike con-
ducted by France in south Libya in November 
2016. Belmokthar’s inability to command might 
provide a rationale for the regrouping of jihadist 
forces in the region at a time when the disper-
sion of Daesh combatants from Libya has the 
potential to generate competition and exacer-
bate frictions. 
Eastern borderlands
In 2012-2013, the eastern borderlands of Mali 
were home to the MUJAO, one of the most le-
thal jihadist groups, with a consolidated record 
of cross-border criminal activities. Yet, since 
2013 the en masse deployment of international 
forces in Gao, the flight of Mokhtar Belmokhtar 
and, since 2014, the regime change in Burkina 
Faso have resulted in the fragmentation of lo-
cal jihadist groups, who now look for alterna-
tive alliances. Today, remnants of the MUJAO 
can be found in the three-state border region 
dividing central-eastern Mali from Burkina 
Faso and Niger. These include most notably the 
groups led by Abou Walid al-Saharawi and by 
the Burkinabé preacher Ibrahim (Bourahima) 
‘Maalam’ Dicko.
Abou Walid Al-Saharawi’s group splintered from 
Belmokhtar’s and since then has been gravitat-
ing around the borders with Niger and Burkina 
Faso, carrying out mainly small-scale acts of 
banditry. Aiming to step up his jihadist profile, 
Al-Saharawi pledged obedience to the ‘Caliph’ 
Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi in May 2015. In 2016, his 
group claimed responsibility for attacks against 
check-points in north Burkina Faso and prisons 
in eastern Niger, which eventually led to the ac-
knowledgement of his bayat (oath of allegiance) 
by Daesh in late 2016. Given these premises, 
al-Saharawi seeks operational support from 
the main Daesh-affiliated actor in the broader 
West African region – namely Boko Haram and 
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the survivors of Daesh offshoots from Libya, al-
though their actual links remain poorly substanti-
ated.
A Fulani native from the north of Burkina Faso 
and a former MUJAO combatant, ‘Maalam’ (trans-
litteration for ‘teacher’ in Arab) Dicko is the leader 
of Ansarul Islam, a group preaching a radical ver-
sion of Islam, which eventually turned into an 
armed movement under the influence of Amadou 
Koufa. Shifting away from political quietism in 
2016, Ansarul now throws lavish weddings, op-
erates public schools and employs traditional 
imams. In December 2016, some 30-40 members 
of Ansarul attacked a Burkinabé military position 
in Nassoumbou, 45km from Djibo, leaving 12 
servicemen dead.
Sharing a similar background in the MUJAO, both 
Al-Saharawi and Maalam Dicko have condemned 
the aligning of jihadist groups inside Mali under 
the al-Qaeda umbrella. In the case of Maalam, 
however, this can be arguably attributed to his 
refusal to subordinate the Fulani struggle under 
the leadership of a Tuareg such as Ag-Ghali. It re-
mains to be seen whether this will incline Ansarul 
towards an affiliation to Daesh, which could pos-
sibly resonate more with ethno-nationalist Fulani 
rhetoric. Recently, Malian and Burkinabé armies – 
as well as French special forces – have undertaken 
major military actions aiming to eradicate armed 
jihadists from the porous borderlands across Mali, 
Niger, and Burkina Faso, which reportedly result-
ed in the deaths of about 20 suspected terrorists, 
with many more arrested and military materiel 
seized.
Understanding complex dynamics
The peace process in Mali has been deteriorating 
into a situation of sustained instability and pro-
tracted conflict in which Mali’s EU-trained mili-
tary pays a weekly toll to jihadist attacks, while 
both MINUSMA and Operation Barkhane have 
come under fire dozens of times. 
While some jihadist formations have acquired a 
distinctive transnational character and now ex-
tend their operational radius across different 
borders, the local dimension of long-term radi-
calisation and present-time recruitment remains 
under-explored. Behind the volatility that charac-
terises the kaleidoscope of armed group acronyms, 
their constant splintering and re-aligning, there is 
undoubtedly an opportunistic strategic calcula-
tion that historically marks indirect and distinctly 
asymmetric forms of warfare. More deeply, how-
ever, one can also find resilient social structures 
that interact with rapidly changing challenges and 
opportunities.  
In particular, an important driver of jihadism in 
this context has to do with its appeal as a com-
pensatory path to social emancipation. Jihadist 
movements tend to present themselves as equal 
employers that beat the drum for Islam as true 
to indigenous aspirations and reject external 
templates stemming from colonial domination. 
By doing so, they drive a wedge in latent forms 
of ethnic/social stratification, provide a bulwark 
of protection against the abuses that accompany 
Mali’s neo-patrimonial governance, and offer sim-
plified and ‘effective’ dispute resolution practices 
which echo local calls to swift action and end 
of impunity. Needless to say, these dynamics are 
more likely to take root in regions where the ac-
tion of the state as a provider of public goods is 
less present and more problematic, and where 
the state’s monopoly of force is more vulnerable – 
such as in neglected regions and in borderlands. 
Widespread insecurity provides fertile ground 
for the development of alternative projects chal-
lenging state authority, including those pitting the 
intransigence of divine law against the failures of 
secular institutions. In the meantime, while jihad-
ist formations grow stronger and show significant 
convergences, the divisions among other armed 
actors – who often trade their cooperation and co-
optation with dividends and impunity – under-
mine the ability of the international community to 
promote positive change. 
The relaunch of France’s political engagement 
in the region – as epitomised by newly elect-
ed President Macron’s first visit to Bamako last 
month – offers an opportunity to provide new 
impetus to the peace process, especially in view 
of the renewal of the mandate of Mali’s UN peace-
keeping mission. However, the idle repetition of 
predictable formulas (enhanced military support, 
showers of external assistance and more regional 
cooperation) has little prospect of success unless 
national and international stakeholders accept to 
bear the cost of addressing key structural aspects 
of bad local governance, social segregation, cor-
ruption and impunity that the jihadists are able to 
exploit for strategic purposes. 
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